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SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
by
ALAYNE B. ADAMS*

I. INTRODUCTION

"It would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved
here was contemplated by the Act . ..."'

Sex is the most personal of human interactions and romance
one of the happiest. Thus, the contention that relations between
individuals in which sexuality was the issue could, when occurring in the work place, constitute a violation of federal law2 has
* Senior Trial Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Memphis District Office, Memphis, Tenn.; B.A., American University, 1963; J.D., Memphis State University, 1974. This article was written by the author in her private
capacity. No official support or endorsement by the EEOC or any other agency
of the United States Government is intended or should be inferred.
Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Section 2000e-2(a) provides:
(a) Employer practices
"(a) [Employers.] It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."
For further reading on sexual harassment and Title VII, see Schrepp, Windham, and Draughn, Sexual HarassmentUnder Title VII: The Legal Status, 32 LAB.
L.J. 238 (1981); Bryan, Sexual HarassmentAs Unlawful DiscriminationUnder Title VII Of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 25 (1980); Comment,
Sexual HarassmentIn The Employment Context: An Analysis Of The New Title
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been difficult for jurists and laypersons to accept. The threshold
of acceptance begins with recognition of the distinction between
sexual harassment and flirtation.
Sexual harassment is an expression of power, not an adjunct
of romance. It is the imposition of authority by sexual extortion.
Sexual harassment may be as crude as rape; it may be as subtle
as a leer. The "personal" nature of sexual harassment has given
pause to courts reluctant to hold employers responsible for what
might have been an isolated incident between two employees of
which the employer had no notice and, thus, no opportunity to
control.
For example, in Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., the first
reported opinion involving a Title VII sexual harassment claim,
the plaintiffs had been employed in clerical positions by the defendant. The two women claimed that their male supervisor had made
incessant verbal and physical sexual demands on them and other
female employees. The supervisor allegedly favored women who
acquiesced with such favors and penalized those who did not. Company officials ignored their complaints, and the women resigned
rather than undergo further alleged harassment.
The women employees then filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and subsequently sued the
company in federal district court. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that even if the supervisor had
acted as charged, forcing the women's resignations, Title VII did
not provide a cause of action. In order for the complaints of conduct to establish a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted, the court declared that the conduct must have rendered
a benefit to the company and have occurred in pursuance of an
enunciated company policy.4 Since the supervisor's behavior
rendered no benefit to the company and was not performed in
the service of company policy, but was merely the expression of
the supervisor's "personal proclivities," the conduct had no relationship to the nature of the employment and thus did not constitute a civil rights violation.'

VII Cause of Action, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 605 (1980); Comment, SexualHarassmentIn
The Work Place: New Rules For An Old And Dirty Game, 14 U.CD. L. REV. 711
(1981).
3 390 F. Supp. 161 (1976).
' Id. at 163.
5 Id.
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The court's concern with the lack of benefit to the company
and with the question of the complained-of action being an assertion of company policy was based on its conclusion that Title VII
regulated the behavior of employers only. The court did not address the issue of respondeat superior, but seemed rather to stutter in its shock at the idea that unwanted and unwelcome sexual
advances which forced women to resign their employment could
rise to the dignity of a cause of action under Title VII. The result
of such a holding would mean, in the court's view, "a potential
federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another. The only sure way an
employer could avoid such charges would be to have employees
who were asexual."
Subsequent courts have held that sexual harassment which
impacts upon employment is a violation of Title VII. The cases
have been presented to the courts as sex discrimination, as sex
and race discrimination combined, or as an imposition of less
favorable working conditions in an environment charged with sexual animus. The courts have premised their finding of employer
liability upon the familiar common law bases of respondeat
superior or an implied ratification of impermissible behavior.
The exclusive concern of Title VII is the imposition of an impermissible factor such as sex, race, religion or national origin
onto the employment relationship. Therefore, regardless of the
legal theory of liability under Title VII, the courts have developed
a standard which requires a plaintiff to establish a nexus between
the alleged harassment and the employment of the harassed
employee. This article will trace the development of this standard and examine methods by which plaintiffs have met the nexus
requirement. Cases will be discussed in some detail to demonstrate
both the effects of sexual harassment on individuals and the attachment of liability on the employer responsible for employee
acts. Finally, case law and the sexual harassment guidelines of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will be compared
to demonstrate the inclusion of case law in those guidelines.

II. REQUIREMENT OF NEXUS FOR INVOCATION
OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

The obvious disdain with which the Come court viewed the
Id. at 163-64.
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claims of the plaintiff women was clearly reflected in Miller v.
Bank of America7 by the district court's definition of the issue
before it: "[Whether Title VII was intended to hold an employer
liable for what is essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex
misconduct of one employee to another."8 The Miller court expressed a concern similar to that in Corme that "flirtation of the
smallest order would give rise to liability"9 and observed that "[t]he
attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural
sex phenomenon" which probably played at least a subtle part
in most personnel decisions."0 The district court then granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff, Margaret Miller, had been employed by the
defendant, Bank of America, and had received excellent evaluations and a raise in salary. However, when she refused her supervisor's demand for sexual favors from "a black chick," she was
fired.
The district court based its decision on sworn statements from
company officials that the bank had a policy against such conduct
and its finding that the plaintiff had not utilized the company's
internal grievance procedures.
Where ... there exists a company-wide policy expressly condemning the alleged misconduct and there exist responsive internal mechanisms established to process employee complaints
of the instant sort, a failure on the part of the employee allegedly
aggrieved by the condemned practice to avail him- or herself
of these internal avenues of redress renders tenuous a finding
of employer culpability."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, comparing it to a situation in which a taxi company could
not be held liable for injuries to a pedestrian because of its driver's
negligence simply because the company had a safety program and
a policy against negligent driving.12
The court observed that employers were generally liable for
the torts of employees acting in the course of their employment.
' 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
S Id. at 234.

1 Id. at 236.
10 Id.

Id. at 236 n.2.
v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).

12 Miller
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Moreover, the Ninth Circuit said it knew of no provision in either
Title VII or 42 U.S.C. 5 198113 which exempted employers from
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Further, the court pointed
out that Title VII defined "employer" to include any agent of an
employer. 4
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals defined
the parameters of an employer's liability for sexual harassment.
"We conclude that respondeat superior does apply here, where
the action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to
hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or
recommend such actions, even though what the supervisor is said
to have done violates the company policy."'5 Thus, the Ninth Circuit distinguished "flirtation" from a violation of Title VII by requiring that the complained of actions be capable of having direct
impact on the employment status of the complaining party.
Other jurisdictions have focused on the effect upon employment by including it in the definition of sexual harassment. In
Heelan v. Johns Manville Corp., the court defined sexual harassment as "'repeated unwelcome sexual advances' which impact as
a term or condition of employment."' 7 The plaintiff had been hired
by the defendant company in 1971 as a senior secretary. In less
than three years, she-had doubled her salary and earned numerous
bonuses, commendations and promotions. The company fired her
in 1974 for poor performance and insubordination. 8 The court
found that the plaintiff had been subjected to "repeated,
unwelcome sexual advances" by her supervisor for two years prior
to her discharge. However, the court ruled that the imposition
of sexual harassment upon an employee did not, in and of itself,
suffice to trigger federal sanctions; "termination of plaintiffs
employment when the advances were rejected made the conduct
legally objectionable."' 9
Citing Heelan, the district court for the Northern District of
Alabama has held that allegations of repeated unwelcome advances
"IPlaintiff had filed suit alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and race
in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
1 600 F.2d at 213.
15
Id.
11451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
1,Id. at 1389.
"Id.
Id. at 1390.
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from a co-worker with no authority as to the plaintiffs employment did not constitute a cause of action under Title VII because
"there was no nexus between the alleged statements and any term
or condition of the plaintiffs employment ... ."I Similarly, another
plaintiffs allegation that her termination was the result of her
rebuff of her department chairman's romantic overtures was found
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
because she had not alleged that he had any input in the decision
to terminate her. Therefore, the court concluded "plaintiff has not
alleged a sufficient nexus between her refusal to accede ... and
her termination."'" Sufficient nexus between the rejection of advances and the refusal to hire,' and between rejection of advances
and termination," was found where the alleged advances were
made by an official with the authority to affect the employment
status of the plaintiffs.
III.

AFFIRMATION BY RATIFICATION

When the Come court held that the supervisor's behavior did
not violate Title VII because it had not occurred in furtherance
of a company policy, it is unlikely that the court really expected
to find an employer which had an enunciated policy requiring harassment of female employees. Rather, the court was expressing
its reluctance to connect the employee's behavior to his employer
so as to subject Bausch and Lomb to liability.
Similarly, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electrical& Gas Co.,"
the district court held that sexual harassment and sexuallymotivated assault did not violate Title VII. "It [Title VII] is not
intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to
a physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather
than in a back alley."' Thus, the court granted, in part, defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Title
VII. However, the court found the connection with the employer
necessary to invoke Title VII in the employer's failure to take
'

Smith v. Rust Engineering Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1173, 1174

(N.D. Ala. 1978).
2

Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979).
Rinkel v. Assoc. Pipeline Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 224

(D. Alaska 1978).

Stringer v. Pennsylvania, 446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
" 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
Id. at 556.
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appropriate remedial action upon being made aware of what had
occurred.26
In the case, Adrienne Tomkins had complained that her supervisor had required her to have lunch with him, purportedly to
discuss her evaluation. During lunch, he made sexual advances
to her and told her that acquiescence was necessary for a satisfactory working relationship. When she attempted to leave, he held
her in the booth and threatened her with physical harm and
economic retaliation. When she complained to his superiors, she
was demoted and subjected to disciplinary layoffs, threats of demotion and salary cuts. The defendant company fired her fifteen
months after the lunch.
The court held that a company's decision to terminate a female
employee who complained of sexual harassment, rather than investigate her complaint, could be a violation of Title VII even
though the action of which she complained was not. Such a decision, the court reasoned, could reflect a decision to favor the male
over the female on the presumption that a male's services are
worth more than those of a female.27
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision to grant part of the defendant's motion to dismiss. The appellate court ruled that Ms. Tomkins' employer had made acquiescence in her supervisor's demands a necessary prerequisite
to continuation of or advancement in her job.28
The Third Circuit defined a violation of Title VII as occurring when:
a supervisor, with the actual or constructive knowledge of the
employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job statusevaluation, continued employment, promotion, or other aspects
of career development-on a favorable response to those ad-

" Id. at 557.
27 Id.

' Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). As
an alternative theory of liability, the plaintiff alleged that her employer had failed
to provide a work environment free from an atmosphere of discrimination. Id.
at 1046 n.1. However, the court did not reach this issue because it found that
the plaintiffs allegations met the two-part test of a condition of employment imposed in a sexually discriminatory manner.
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vances or demands, and the employer does not take prompt and
appropriate remedial action after acquiring such knowledge."
Thus, the Third Circuit established the connection between the
acts of the supervisor and the responsibility of the employer on
the elements of notice, the impact on the victim's employment
status and the response of the employer upon becoming aware
of the harassment.
It is to the final element of the Tomkins formula that courts
have looked to find that corporations have become parties to acts
of sexual harassment by failing to condemn them and thus acquiesce in the perpetration. In Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co.,"
the court placed an affirmative duty on an employer to investigate
complaints of sexual harassment." Maxine Munford had been hired
to work as an assistant collections manager for the defendant.
On January 28, 1976, the first day she began work, a supervisor
made sexual overtures which she rejected. He suggested that her
job might depend on her response to his demands. Over the next
several days the supervisor made repeated sexual suggestions to
Ms. Munford, both verbally and by leaving obscene cartoons on
her desk. When she threatened to report him, he told her she
would be fired.
On February 12, 1976, the supervisor told her she was to accompany him on a business trip to Grand Rapids, Michigan, where
she would share a motel room with him and have sexual relations
with him. When she refused, the supervisor fired her. The plaintiff complained to company officials but to no avail.
In filing her civil suit, the plaintiff proceeded on the theory
that although company officials had not engaged in any actual sexual harassment against her, they were equally liable because they
had ratified the conduct by acquiescing in it without any investigation of her allegations. The court agreed. "The failure to investigate gives tacit support to the discrimination because the
absence of sanctions encourages abusive behavior. '' 2
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly has held
that a complaint alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title
VII is sufficient if it contains allegations that an employer
Id. at 1048-49.
441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
" Id. at 466.
32 Id-
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acquiesced in a practice of compelling female employees to submit to the sexual advances of their supervisors.' The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia holds an employer generally
liable for the discriminatory acts of its supervisory personnel.
However, the employer may be relieved of responsibility for such
acts where the supervisor acted in contravention of company policy
and the employer, upon becoming aware of the occurrence, took
timely and appropriate steps to rectify the wrong."
SEXUAL HARASSMENT As
CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT

IV.

A

A. HistoricalDevelopment From Other Forms of Discrimination
Recognition of the imposition of an unfavorable condition of
employment based on the discriminatory attitudes of supervisors
and co-employees did not originate in cases alleging sexual harassment. In 1971, the Fifth Circuit found that a working environment could be so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
the psychological and emotional stability of minority group
workers in violation of Title VII.3 5
In Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission," the
complainant, Ms. Chavez, was employed by an optometrist located
in Texas. Ms. Chavez filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that
she, a Spanish-surnamed American, was being discriminated
against in the terms and conditions of her employment because
of the disparity in the doctor's treatment of his Spanish and AngloSaxon patients. She made no allegation of direct mistreatment
because of her national origin.
The case came before a federal district court because of the
doctor's refusal to provide patients' files to the Commission. The
district court upheld Rogers' position on the basis that even if
the doctor had segregated his patients as Ms. Chavez had alleged,
and even if such treatment made her uncomfortable in her job,
she was not an aggrieved person in the sense contemplated by
37
Title VII.
The appellate court disagreed, finding that the relationship

'

Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
316 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
Id. at 425.
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between an employee and the working environment was of sufficient significance to be entitled to statutory protection.
Employees' psychological as well as economic fringes are
statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and ...
the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in
Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that Ms. Chavez could be an aggrieved
person because of the atmosphere in which she worked.
Similarly, in Carrollv. Talman FederalSavings & Loan Association,39 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the
imposition of a dress code on female employees, but not on male
employees, to be a demeaning condition of employment based on
impermissible sexual stereotypes. The defendant required its
female employees to wear uniforms of interchangeable slacks, tops,
skirts and jackets. The men were permitted to exercise individual
taste and discretion in their choice of attire. Women, the defendant explained, dressed "competitively" and so could not be
trusted to exercise good business judgment in their choice of attire. Interestingly, the district court found that neither the plaintiff, who refused to wear the uniform, or the other women, when
allowed to appear in clothing of their own choice on the once a
month "glamour day," had ever appeared in any clothing that was
less than dignified or that was inappropriate for a business
occassion.
Nevertheless, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the women were
not affected in their employment opportunities by being required
to wear recognizable uniforms." Although the uniforms were not
provocative as in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Sage Realty,41 or disfiguring, the Court of Appeals held that "when
some employees are uniformed and others are not there is a
natural tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a
lesser professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business clothes. '' 42 The court concluded that the defendant
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
448 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
41 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
42 604 F.2d at 1033.
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had discriminated against women in violation of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
B.

Racial and Ethnic Harassment Compared

The liability of an employer for the contamination of a work
environment due to racial, ethnic and religious taunts and slurs
depends in large part on who the offenders are and what the
employer's reaction is. Although the employer may be absolutely
liable for the acts of his supervisors, an employer they avoid liability to the extent that it tried to exercise control over employees
to prevent such behavior.
In Howardv. National Cash Register Co., the plaintiff, a black
male, had been encouraged by his supervisors to apply for a plant
guard position. He applied, was given appropriate training and
was appointed to the position. No evidence was presented that
plaintiff had suffered any discrimination in any of the terms of
his employment other than harassment from his white co-workers
because of his race. To the contrary, the evidence showed that
he earned slightly more than the average guard and had the sympathetic attention of management when he complained of jokes
about and reference to his race. Each of his complaints was diligently investigated and appropriate action was taken. One
employee who had used the word "nigger" in his presence was
suspended for three days. Meetings were held with employees and
supervisors at which company policy was made explicit- harassment of other employees because of race or other ethnic or
religious basis would not be tolerated.
The court found that the plaintiff had not been subjected to
a concerted pattern of harassment, but had been the subject of
a few isolated incidents which the defendant's supervisors acted
to correct as soon as they had knowledge of them."' The court
concluded that "the defendant in this case is charged with avoiding
all discrimination; the defendant is not charged by law with
discharging all Archie Bunkers in its employ."4 5
In Compston v. Borden, Inc.,46 the court held the employer
'3 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
1, Id. at 606.
45 Id.

" 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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liable for subjecting an employee to an unfavorable condition of
employment resulting from his supervisor's taunts and jibes about
his ancestry. Ironically, the evidence did not support a finding
that the plaintiff was, in fact, of Jewish ancestry. It did, however,
support a finding that his supervisor believed he was Jewish and
had subjected him to malicious invectives.
The opinion gave no indication that the plaintiff had complained of his supervisor's harassment, but the court declared that
when "a person vested with managerial responsibilities embarks
upon a course of conduct calculated to demean an employee before
his fellows because of the employee's professed religious views,
such activity will necessarily have the effect of altering the conditions of his employment."47
The Compston opinion would appear to hold employers liable
for harassment of employees by their supervisors whether the
employer had knowledge of that harassment or not. Other courts
have held employers liable for such acts "only where the employer,
either overtly, or covertly, authorized, acquiesced in or ratified
the supervisor's discriminatory conduct." 8 The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has gone further, however, holding an
employer responsible for its supervisors' actions or inactions in
preventing harassment as opposed to merely stopping it when
it occurs."9
Demanding not only remedy but also prevention may seem
an onerous burden. However, the response of the employer to
employee complaints will have an impact not only on the
employer's liability, as seen in Howard, but also as a definition
of that behavior which is acceptable and that which is not.
C.

Ratification of Sexual Harassment by Acquiescence

The response, or rather, the lack of response of an employer
to allegations of sexual harassment by co-employees, was a critical
factor in the landmark decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court
5 0
The state sued pursuant
in Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota.
to the state legislation modeled on Title VII, on behalf of a black,
female former employee of the defendant, Continental Can. The
" Id. at 160-61.

, Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 383 (E.D. Va. 1977).
DeGrace v. Rumsfield, 614 F.2d 796 (st Cir. 1980).
297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
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woman alleged that she had been hired by Continental Can in
December, 1974, to work in a plant in which only one other woman
was employed. She stated that both she and the other woman
had been subjected to explicit, sexually derogatory remarks, had
been the recipients of unwelcome sexual advances, and that she
had been humiliated both racially and sexually by three coworkers. One of the men, referring to the movie Mandingo, told
her that if slavery were legal he would own her and train her
sexually to be his "bitch." She and the one other female worker
complained to their supervisor in March. However, his response
was that they must expect such behavior if they wanted to work
with men. The tempo of the harassment increased. One co-worker
began patting the woman's buttocks each time he was near her.
Three men told the two women that any woman who worked in
a plant had to be a "tramp." On October 13, 1975, one man grabbed
the plaintiff between the legs as she bent over a piece of
machinery. She immediately complained to the plant manager, but
no action was taken.
Soon afterwards, the plaintiff's husband confronted one of her
tormentors in the plant parking lot. Later, when the husband came
at midnight to escort his wife home because of fear for her safety, they discovered that the headlights on her car had been
smashed.
The company verbally reprimanded the co-worker the next
day for the parking lot confrontation. On that same day, another
employee confronted the plaintiff at her home-she had been
afraid to return to work-and, in the presence of her children,
threatened her with a gun. The plaintiff then had several meetings
with plant officials, but she refused to return to work because
her employer refused to guarantee her physical safety.
The company, under pressure from the Urban League and the
New Way Community Center, and spurred by threats of adverse
publicity, suspended two of the co-workers for six weeks. Continental Can then initiated a formal investigation. The firm held a
plant meeting at which time employees were advised that the company did not approve of sexual harassment. Soon afterwards, the
plaintiff, who had been -afraid to return to work, was discharged.
She had lasted one year in a "man's" job.
After her termination, she filed a charge with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights alleging that Continental Can and
its plant manager had discriminated against her on the basis of
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her sex with respect to the condition of her employment. The
department found cause to believe that the company had violated
state law and filed a complaint against Continental Can and the
plant manager. After a hearing, the examiner concluded that Continental Can had committed two unfair discriminatory employment
practices and that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged
as a result. Continental Can appealed the decision to the trial court
which dismissed the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en bane, looked to Title VII cases for precedent as directed by state statute. The court
found that the Title VII cases had been brought on causes factually distinguishable from the one before it because those cases
involved situations in which a female employee's promotion or
retention of her job was conditioned upon her dispensation of sexual favors. "It is as invidious, although less recognizable when
employment is conditional either explicitly or impliedly on adapting to a work place in which repeated and unwelcome sexually
derogatory remarks and sexually motivated physical conduct are
directed at an employee because she is a female."5
The court held that an employer is liable within the purview
of the Minnessota statute for acts of sexual harassment which
impact on the condition of employment when that employer knew
or should have known and failed to take timely and appropriate
action The court's emphasis was very much on the reaction of
an employer to such behavior. It explicitly found that the act imposed no duty upon an employer to maintain a "pristine working
environment," but that it did impose a duty of timely and appropriate response to complaints of harassment.' The court concluded
that Continental Can had discriminated against the plaintiff when
she first complained in March of 1975. The court recognized that
because she had refused at that time to name her tormentors,
the company was limited in its response but that the total lack
of response constituted an unfair practice.
Next, the state supreme court focused on the timeliness of
the defendant's action in regard to the "grabbing incident" and
concluded that Continental Can's failure to act promptly "connected" the company to that act of harassment. Therefore, Continental Can had committed a second unfair discriminatory prac-

51 Id. at 248.

Id. at 249.
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tice. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged when she could only avoid those intolerable
working conditions by resigning.
Because the Minnessota court found that the plaintiff had been
constructively discharged, it did not have before it the question
of a discriminatory work environment which had no effect on
employees other than requiring them to accept daily humiliation
3
as the price for maintaining their job. In Bundy v. Jackson,"
the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia faced that issue
and held that an employer violated Title VII when it subjected
female employees to sexual harassment even though the resistance
of the female employees did not deprive them of any tangible job
rights. The district court, which had ruled otherwise, had made
an express finding of fact that sexual advances to female
employees in the defendant's agency was "standard operating procedure, a fact of life, a normal condition of employment in the
office,"' but failed to find a violation of Title VII. Plaintiff Sandra
Bundy alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment by
her supervisors and had complained to their superior. However,
no action was taken and she was told that "any man in his right
mind would want to rape you.""
Because the plaintiff had been harassed by supervisory personnel and had put the employer on notice, the issue of whether
notice to the employer of acts of misconduct by supervisory employees was necessary to invoke liability did not arise. Neither
did the issue of employer liability for acts of non-supervisory employees arise. However, the court's analysis of injury done to a
female employee when she must work in an atmosphere of degradation and humiliation because of her sex strongly indicated that
it would hold an employer liable, at least upon notice, for any
impermissibly-based situation which subjected an employee to less
desirable working conditions because of his protected classification.
In reaching its conclusion, the D.C. Circuit referred to Rogers
and Talman as authority for the proposition that racial or ethnic
discrimination which manifests itself exclusively by poisoning the
work environment violates Title VII. The court then compared
those types of discrimination to sexual harassment. "How then

641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 828, 831 (D.D.C. 1979).
SId.
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can sexual harassment, which injects the most demeaning sexual
stereotype into the general work environment and which always
represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost
privacy, not be illegal?"' The court pointed out the illogical nature
of demanding that a person be fired or suffer some other tangible deprivation before permitting a legal remedy. To do so, held
the court, would endorse the employer's right to subject a person
to a work environment in which endurance of indignities and
degradation would be without remedy as long as employment continued.57
In Kyriazi v. Westera Electric Co.,58 a case which alleged
employment discrimination against women as a class in hiring,
pay and promotion and which, after a finding of liability, was settled for six million dollars, the plaintiff also alleged sexual
harassment.
The plaintiff, Cleo Kyriazi, was a Greek engineer employed
by Western Electric. The court found that Kyriazi had been subjected to harassment by her three male co-workers in the form
of loud and bawdy speculations as to her marital status and her
virginity, physical confrontations, and an obscene cartoon of which
she was the subject. Her complaints, which the court characterized as being vociferous and repeated, were largely ignored.' 9 She
was told that she should be complimented that the young men
took such an interest in her, and that such things happened "in
a man's working world" every day of the week. When she, in frustration and fury, turned on one of the men and suggested that
he was a homosexual, she was sharply criticized for her behavior.
The only investigation into any of Kyriazi's complaints occurred
after she threatened suit and consisted of interviews of the three
men. In fact, the company told Kyriazi that she had to seek psychiatric help or be terminated. Such disregard of her complaints
exacerbated the situation by encouraging the perpetrators and
infuriating the victim. "When they totally disregarded Kyriazi's
complaints about the cartoon and the boisterous speculations about
her virginity, she was left with the understanding that her supervisors were discriminating against her and in favor of her male
641 F.2d at 945.

Id. at 945-46.
461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
s Id. at 935.
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co-workers." Thus, the employer became a party to the harassment by refusing to alleviate the conditions of Kyriazi's work environment. Even prior to the threat of termination, Kyriazi's
shame from the treatment to which she was subjected and her
subsequent pain and rage were evident in her somewhat inarticulate discussion with her employer.6 1 She would have been
allowed to continue in her employment if only she had submitted
to the degradation imposed upon her by her co-workers and of
which her employer, by its inaction, gave approval.
D. Available Remedies
In her complaint, Dr. Kyriazi alleged common law tort claims
as well as violation of Title VII. Thus, the court was able to require the three men who had taken such pleasure in harassing
her to each pay $1,500 with no contribution from the company.
In Compston, which was filed under Title VII, the court found
that the plaintiff had been fired for legitimate reasons, but had
been harassed during his employment because of his purported
ancestry. The court awarded, perhaps quixotically, "nominal"
damages of $50 plus attorney's fees. Title VII, of course, does not
provide for damages other than for lost wages, reinstatement and
other equitable relief.62 However, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out
in Bundy, it would be a violation of the public policy expressed
by the enactment of Title VII to refuse an employee relief unless
and until he had been forced to relinquish a position or promotion because of his objection to a demeaning condition of his job.,
Through the decisions in Bundy, Kyriazi and Continental Can,
harassment as a condition of employment has been recognized to
be a violation of Title VII. However, absent a direct impact on
the employment status of the victim, a remedy other than
equitable relief remains beyond the parameters of Title VII.
V.

EEOC GUIDELINES

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission published
its "Final Amendment to Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex"' in October, 1980. The Commission defined sexual harassc Id.
61

Id.

at 93541.

, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(g) (1976).
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
29 C.F.R. Part 1604.11 (1980).
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ment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors
or physical conduct of a sexual nature"6 5 when:
1) submission is a term or condition of employment;
2) submission or rejection is the basis for employment decisions;
3) such conduct unreasonably interferes with work performances or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment."
The Commission conditioned the degree of the employer's
responsibility on the relationship of the harasser to the victim.
According to the Guidelines, an employer is absolutely responsible for the actions of its supervisory personnel whether or not
it had knowledge or notice of those actions. However, where the
malfactor was not supervisory but was a co-employee, the employer becomes responsible for those acts only when it knew or
should have known of the acts. Even then, liability attaches only
if it failed to take immediate and appropriate remedial action. The
Commission went a step beyond the decided cases and declared
that an employer could be held responsible for the behavior of
non-employees if it knew or should have known of the behavior
and failed to take appropriate action.
The Commission had first proposed employer liability for
harassment by non-employees in its "Interim Interpretive Guidelines" in March, 1980. Before corporate teeth could manage a proper gnashing, the United States Court for Southern New York
issued an exemplary ruling. On defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court ruled that an employer who, ignoring an
employee's complaints, required her, as a condition of her employment, to wear in public a sexually provocative costume may be
held liable under Title VII for the sexual harassment of that
employee by members of the public.
Margaret Hasselman was employed by Sage Realty Corp. as
a lobby hostess at a Manhattan office building. The male and
female lobby attendants were required to wear outfits specified
by Sage. The costumes were normally changed twice a year. The
women's uniforms included tennis outfits and kilts while the men
wore suits in complementary colors. In June 1976, Sage chose a
skimpy red, white and blue "Bicentennial" poncho which revealed
65

Id.

66

Id.

67 EEOC

v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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portions of the plaintiffs breasts and buttocks. The company discharged her when she refused to wear the outfit. In the complaint,
filed on her behalf by the EEOC and the National Employment
Law Project, Hasselman alleged that she had been subjected to
lewd comments and sexual advances from members of the public
on the two days she had worn the poncho. The requirement that
she wear the sexually provocative outfit was sex based because,
but for being female, she would not have been required to expose
her body and endure the public's sexual harassment as a condition of her employment. She also contended that the costume bore
no rational relationship to her job but simply was an onerous and
irrational condition based on outmoded sexual stereotypes.
The defendant countered by filing a motion for summary judgment based on Title VII cases upholding an employer's right to
maintain grooming and dress codes. The court rejected the motion, stating, "None of these cases support the proposition that
an employer has unfettered discretion under Title VII to require
its employees to wear any type of uniform the employer chooses,
including uniforms which may be characterized as revealing and
sexually provocative."68
At trial,69 witnesses testified that the garment not only was
not job related, but impeded the plaintiff in her duties. The poncho had been constructed for a prototype four inches shorter than
the plaintiff and its flowing folds interfered with her ability to
operate elevators and to perform other parts of her job. Furthermore, the plaintiff revealed parts of her body each time she
stooped or walked. The district court awarded full damages as
prescribed by Title VII.
Although not explicitly stated in the Guidelines, the degree
of responsibility imposed on the employer is directly proportional
to the degree of control the employer might be expected to be
able to exercise over the perpetrator. It readily may be assumed
that an employer will be in closer contact and hence able to exercise greater control over its supervisors than over other employees. Thus, with differing degrees of control, differing degrees of
responsibility may be imposed. But what control may an employer
exercise over non-employees sufficient to impose responbility for
their actions? In Sage, the onus for the sexual harassment by
Id. at 609.
521 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N..Y. 1981).
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members of the public was imposed not because of any control
the employer might be expected to have over the public, but
because the employer imposed a condition of employment which
would produce certain foreseeable results and because it was put
on notice that those foreseeable results had, in fact, occurred. By
refusing to alleviate the cause of the harassment, the employer
had made sexual harassment by non-employees a condition of
employment. Thus, although the employer could not exercise control over the behavior of non-employees, it could have controlled
the onerous condition which excited that behavior and it chose
not to.
Additionally, an employer may also control the behavior of
non-employees within its environ by refusing access to persons
whose behavior could, if permitted by the employer, give rise to
a condition of employment. Thus, an employer which has notice
of unsuitable behavior on the part of a patient, client, customer
or salesperson could, if it fails to take effective remedial action,
be held liable under Title VII for having imposed an unfavorable
condition of employment on an employee because of that employee's race, sex, color, age, religion or national origin.
The Commission, in its Guidelines, urged employers to take
appropriate affirmative steps to prevent sexual harassment and
avoid liability by clearly enunciating a policy in opposition to such
behavior, by establishing procedures for resolving such complaints,
by receiving all such complaints with dignity and seriousness and
by promptly investigating and taking prompt and appropriate
action.
The Commission at the close of its Guidelines, outlines an intriguing Title VII violation which is certain to become the subject of future litigation. Under the Guidelines, if sexual favors
are demanded of an employee in exchange for employment benefits
and if the transaction is completed-i.e., the sexual favors are
granted and the employment benefits bestowed, the employer may
be liable for sex discrimination to other employees who were equally or better qualified and who did not receive the same employment benefits." There are no reported cased involving this proposed cause of action; however, defendants have argued in sex
harassment cases that the plaintiffs had not been discriminated
against because of their sex but because they had rejected the
" 29 C.F.R. Part 1604.11 (1980).
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advances of a supervisor."' The ready response of the courts was
72
Phillipsv. Martin-Marietta
in which the defendant was held to
have violated Title VII by its refusal to hire women with preschool age childred although they did hire similarly situated men.
The Supreme Court noted that although the defendant did not
discriminate against all women, they did discriminate against all
women of a certain category-those having young children. Thus,
the concept of "sex-plus" was born and later ratified in cases
against airlines which refused employment to women who wore
glasses73 or who were married74 although they hired other women
as well as married and bespectacled men.
In two cases involving pregnancy, 5 the Court divided the
population into two interesting categories of pregnant persons and
non-pregnant persons of either sex. The Court then proceeded
to hold that denial of disability benefits to "pregnant persons"
was not sexually discriminatory because persons in the remaining category were of both sexes. Conversely, it may be argued
that a person of either sex, who is denied an employment opportunity in favor of a person who acquiesced to a sexual demand,
may have a cause of action under Title VII.
VI.

CONCLUSION

From the relatively new body of law on sexual harassment
as a violation of Title VII, it is possible to define certain responsibilities which, if neglected by an employer, will give rise to a
cause of action under Title VII.
The Guidelines and the case law impose an obvious duty on
an employer, upon having notice of harassment of an employee
protected by Title VII, to take prompt and effective remedial action. An employer may not, as did Western Electric and Continental Can, fail to take appropriate action because the employer thus
ratifies and becomes a party to impermissible actions. Less clear,
however, is the employer's liability for the acts of supervisors
" Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413
F.Supp. 654 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
12 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
, Laffey v. North West Airlines, Inc., 366 F.Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973).
" Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

404 U.S. 991 (1972).
"

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429

U.S. 125 (1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
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of which it has not had notice. The question of whether the
employer should have known is a question of fact to be determined
in each instance. The issue as to whether an employer was aware
that an impermissible condition of employment was imposed on
employees by the creation of an unsavory work environment by
other employees also is a question of fact. However, like the notice
to an employer of harassment by supervisors, notice of such condition which is unheeded will trigger an allegation of violation
of Title VII.
In conclusion, the imposition of sexual demands by a supervisor, or the creation of an odious work environment by supervisors or co-employees may constitute a violation of Title VII. Complete remedy for such violation may, in certain cases, be achieved
only through resort to other statutes. The imposition of liability
absent clear notice to the employer may be an issue of fact. However, both the case law and the Guidelines do exhort the prudent
employer to take preventive measures to establish a work environment free of the pollution of sexual harassment.
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